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Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography cover
Hybrid ·Peer-reviewed·ISSN (Online): 2169-0065·ISSN (Print): 0972-0529

Monthly Journal: Publishes theoretical and applied research in all areas of Discrete Mathematical Sciences, Cryptography, Combinatorics, Elliptic Curves and Information Security.

Issues up to 2022 co-published with and available at:Taylor & Francis Online
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Open Access Research Article

Solving noisy systems of equations to enhance side-channel attacks on Dilithium

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pp. 2333–2347Vol. 29Issue 6June 2026DOI: 10.47974/JDMSC-2598 Crossmark XML
Received:
01 Apr 2025
Published Online:
22 May 2026
Article type:
Research Article
Language:
EN
Article no.:
JDMSC-2598
Pages:
2333–2347

Abstract

CRYSTALS-Dilithium, known also as FIPS-204 is one of the post-quantum signature schemes standardized by NIST. In this paper we investigate and enhance a side-channel attack on Dilithium proposed by Marzougui et al. [18], which leverages leaked data to recover parts of the private key. Recovery involves employing a MILP model to solve a noisy system of linear equations. We propose two new integer optimisation models, one linear and one nonlinear, which aimed at improving the efficiency of the attack. In particular, the nonlinear model improved success rates by up to 84 percentage points, significantly improving the practicality of attacks in scenarios with limited data and higher levels of noise. Our results emphasize the need for defensive measures in Dilithium implementations, protecting against side-channel attacks. 

Keywords

Subject Classifications

94A6090C0590C26

References

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