The enhancement of quantum key distribution protocol to increase communication security between two parties

Somsuk, Kritsanapong; Sanemueang, Chalida; Khummanee, Suchart; Suwannapong, Chanwit; Atsawaraungsuk, Sarutte

doi:10.47974/JIM-1640

Open Access Research Article

The enhancement of quantum key distribution protocol to increase communication security between two parties

^*Kritsanapong SomsukCorresponding authorkritsanapong@udru.ac.thDepartment of Computer and Communication EngineeringFaculty of TechnologyUDRUUdon Thani Rajabhat UniversityUdon Thani, Thailand0000-0002-7264-4628View full profile → , Chalida SanemueangChalida.sa@udru.ac.thOffice of Academic Resources and Information TechnologyUDRUUdon Thani Rajabhat UniversityUdon Thani, ThailandView full profile → , Suchart Khummaneesuchart.k@msu.ac.thDepartment of Computer ScienceFaculty of InformaticsMahasarakham UniversityMahasarakham, ThailandView full profile → , Chanwit Suwannapongschanwit@npu.ac.thDepartment of Computer EngineeringFaculty of EngineeringNakhon Phanom UniversityNakhon Phanom, ThailandView full profile → , Sarutte Atsawaraungsuksarutte@udru.ac.thDepartment of Computer EducationUdon Thani Rajabhat UniversityUdon Thani, 41000, ThailandView full profile →

* Corresponding author · click or hover a name for details

pp. 33–55Vol. 27Issue 1February 2024DOI: 10.47974/JIM-1640XML

Received:: 09 Aug 2022
Accepted:: 09 Nov 2022
Published Online:: 27 Feb 2024
Article type:: Research Article
Language:: EN
Article no.:: JIM-1640
Pages:: 33–55

Abstract

In this research, a new technique based on quantum key distribution (QKD) is described to lower the likelihood that eavesdroppers can intercept two-party communications without being detected by the sender and the recipient. The central idea is to enhance BB84 by increasing two quantum gates, Pauli-X gate and Pauli-Z gate, on both the sender and receiver sides to change the direction of each quantum state. This signifies that three control parameters must be specified to control three gates on both sides, excluding the control parameter for the quantum gate that generates a random bit on the sender side. In fact, the possibility that eavesdroppers may discreetly capture the information is 0.5 for nearly all methods. However, the probability of information captured by an eavesdropper decreases to 0.25 when all conceivable cases from Tables 1 through 7 are considered. Therefore, the proposed technique for exchanging the secret key is more secure and should be chosen for the implementation.

Keywords

QKD BB84 Quantum computer Cryptography Secret key

Subject Classifications

94A6068M2581P94

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